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A Future for Paris? Federalism, the Law of
Nations, and U.S. Courts
JAMISON E. COLBURN†

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 1992 (UNFCCC),1 states-parties have negotiated commitments to address global warming at annual conferences of the parties.
The Paris Conference of the Parties (COP21) agreement in 2015 was
carefully structured to help the U.S. President commit the nation to
its multilateral pledges without having to seek U.S. Senate or Congressional assent to doing so.2 The Obama Administration then made
that commitment, not just to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions, but also to cooperate fully in the research and coordinative
tasks set out in the agreement, at the very end of its 2012-16 term.3
President Trump’s announcement in June 2017 that he would withdraw the United States from COP21 to seek a better deal from major
trading partners (China and the European Union especially),4 sig© 2019 Jamison E. Colburn
†
Professor of Law & Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar, Penn State University.
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature
June 4, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2. Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, at 21.
3. Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1681–82 (2017) (describing President Obama’s characterization of the Paris Agreement at its announcement as “historic” and
an “ambitious” “enduring framework the world needs to solve the climate crisis,” and the
rapid progressions from Paris’s entry into force to President Trump’s announced intentions
to withdraw).
4. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201 (2018).
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naled no intention to withdraw contrary to Article 28 or to withdraw
from the UNFCCC under its terms. Article 28 makes the earliest
possible withdrawal date from COP21 November 4, 2020—the day
after the next U.S. presidential election.5
The coalition of state governors, mayors, county executives, and
other leaders that quickly formed and announced their intentions to
keep the U.S. pledges in Paris notwithstanding Trump’s announced
plans raised profound questions about our federalism and foreign relations.6 Dubbed “We Are Still In,” this coalition may present U.S.
domestic courts with an unprecedented situation in foreign affairs
federalism. With most of what the preceding administration implemented domestically to address climate disruption being dismantled
by the current Administration, and much of COP21 having been designed to serve a highly strategized mitigation agenda that would unfold decades into the future,7 these courts may have to confront several exceedingly complex balances of state autonomy, presidential
authority, and the place of international law within U.S. law. And
they will do so with an issue set that has been exceedingly polarizing
even by today’s standards.
The argument here is simple: simplistic invocations of “one
voice” doctrines8 or other forms of broadly preemptive deference to a
(current) president’s announced policy intentions cannot substitute
for what courts and courts alone must do in any exercise of judicial
power: say what the law is. The context is anything but simple.
Long traditions in both ethics and economics have aimed to knit bottom-up and top-down decision-making together.9 What the Trump
Administration’s announced intentions to withdraw from Paris seem
to have accomplished is to shift the burden of action on the American
5. See G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, art. 28, Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
6. Cf. Jean Galbraith, Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean
for Climate Change Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 274 (2018) (“President
Trump has done the impossible: he has made the international community enthusiastic about
U.S. federalism. Even as they express dismay at Trump’s plan to abandon the Paris Agreement, foreign leaders and internationalists have praised the efforts of U.S. states and cities to
combat climate change mitigation in accordance with the Agreement’s goals.”).
7. See infra notes 13–127 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 190, 249 and accompanying text.
9. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE (8th ed.
1882) (defending empiricist utilitarian methods making use of both inductive and deductive
inferences about people, markets and society); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20–21,
48–51 (1971) (defending a method of normative ethics that seeks a “reflective equilibrium”
between top-down theorizing and bottom-up considered judgments).
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pledges in Paris to states, local governments, and leading market and
nonprofit actors—in other words, to bottom-up decision-makers.10 If
the United States is to play any constructive part in addressing this
unprecedented threat to global peace, security, and life on Earth, the
burden of action will be shouldered for the foreseeable future by subnational governments and private parties.
Part II introduces the Paris agreement in its unique diplomatic,
legal, and environmental context. Part II then describes some enduring tensions of our foreign affairs federalism and the Supreme
Court’s most recent forays into them. Part III then anticipates three
contexts in which American courts are most likely to confront the
unprecedented as subnational governments strive to fulfill national
commitments registered under the COP framework despite a current
president’s avowed intentions to raze that very framework. The conclusion considers the prospect of the 2020 election and how little that
will probably matter to the major questions raised here.
II. THE UNFCCC, MITIGATION STRATEGY IN TIME, AND THE PARIS
AGREEMENT
Conventional wisdom categorizes treaties to protect the global
commons as trading off depth for breadth.11 The more stringent the
commitments (depth), that is, the fewer participants (breadth) that
should be expected.12 This wisdom flows directly from the view that
use of a global commons is the externalization of “costs” of some
kind and, thus, treaties reversing that dynamic simply internalize
those costs back onto the users of the commons. But this consensus
can obscure the unique dimensions of global climate disruption, especially the technological innovation needed to avert its worst manifestations. The innovations embodied in the Paris Agreement reflect
10. Chris Mooney, Trump Withdrew from the Paris Climate Deal A Year Ago. Here’s
What Has Changed, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ene
rgy-environment/wp/2018/06/01/trump-withdrew-from-the-paris-climate-plan-a-year-ago-he
res-what-has-changed/ (noting that Trump’s announcement spurred considerable subnational
action but left a “fog when it comes to what U.S. national policy is or should be—something
not even the administration seems to know”).
11. See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154–87 (HARVARD UNIV. PRESS, 2010); SCOTT BARRETT,
ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 49–
84 (2003).
12. Thomas C. Schelling, The Cost of Combating Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF.
(Nov.-Dec. 1997), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/cost-combating-globa
l-warming; WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992); see also
BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 165.
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those dimensions, yielding a deal that defied conventional wisdom
and may well survive Trump’s vacuum. Before Paris is made to fail
in execution, we must recognize the agreement’s unique approach to
this globally-scaled, complex collective action problem. For if we
eventually mark 2015 as a turning point in collective action against
climate disruption, it will be because this approach succeeded where
orthodox diplomacy and conventional wisdom both failed.
This article argues that implementing Paris in the United States
(U.S.), the European Union (EU) and other open economies will entail bold innovations, mirroring those fashioned in the agreement itself, which will be susceptible to several lines of attack in domestic
courts. Only if courts adopt a discriminating approach to those challenges will they be able properly to apply the law without unnecessary costs to the climate and future generations. There are three important dimensions to distinguishing Paris from what preceded it.
First, Paris was the culmination of two decades of experience with
the UNFCCC and its novel approach to international obligations.
Second, mitigating climate disruption is a special type of good, unlike
many more familiar goods in environmental protection. Finally, Paris’s strategic significance must be understood in light of the counting
difficulties with actions and quantities of such scale and scope, as
well as the economic leakage that threatens any ambitious mitigation
plans.
A. The Convention/Protocol Model in Retreat: The Rise of
Pledge and Review
The Paris Agreement was the result of twenty-one “conferences
of the parties” to the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC was done twentyseven years ago to much fanfare at the “Earth Summit” in Río de
Janeiro.13 The convention created the COPs as a step-wise path to
the collective settling of mitigation obligations. But the actual steps
along that path dissipated what little good faith had accrued in Río,
eventually leading the parties to fashion a unique, unilateralist
‘pledge-and-review’ model in its place in 2015. This section traces
that progression and describes the Paris Agreement’s key features
setting it apart both from the UNFCCC COPs and from the norms of
international environmental law.

13. BARRETT, supra note 11. Several multilateral conventions—both broad and deep—
emerged from Río, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Río Declaration. See Catherine Redgwell, International Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
687, 691 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).
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The UNFCCC’s stated purpose, preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”14 was phrased in careful but nebulous terms. Most importantly, whatever legal obligations
flow from the UNFCCC are collective obligations and that severely
complicates their fulfillment by the traditional means of international
law. The UNFCCC dubbed these the “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”—Río’s reference to obligations negotiators could name but could not specify.15 As a principal
party to those negotiations, the United States quickly signed and then
ratified the “framework” convention.16 Like many signatories,
though, the United States rightly saw in the UNFCCC an “agreement
to agree” on emissions abatement obligations.17 Quite apart from
abatement per se, though, parties to the UNFCCC obliged themselves
to collect data and report on their domestic greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions,18 to analyze and report any abatement efforts they were
making,19 and to base future negotiations on the “best available scien-

14. UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 2.
15. Article 3 states that “[t]he parties should protect the climate system for the benefit
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” UNFCCC,
supra note 1, at art. 3(1). Typically, treaties that adopt obligations of such uncertain stringency do so out of a lack of agreement among the negotiating parties. See BARRETT, supra
note 13, at 141–47; BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 187; David A. Wirth, The International
and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 521–32 (2015).
16. See Wirth, supra note 15, at 521. A “framework” convention is negotiated with the
express intention of filling out substantive obligations through subsequent agreements or
‘protocols.’ Id. at 519. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was the first attempted protocol to the
UNFCCC, aiming to reduce global emissions 5% below 1990 levels. See Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1997,
2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The Senate Committee that recommended
ratification of the UNFCCC made its views known at the time that it expected any future
protocols establishing binding emissions cuts to be presented to the Senate for its advice and
consent. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-55, at 14 (1992).
17. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 458–60 (1993). Although this model had grown
common, it failed quite precipitously with the Kyoto Protocol. Cf. BARRETT, supra note 13,
at 360 (calling the convention/protocol approach the wrong model and “unlikely to sustain
meaningful cooperation” on GHG abatement).
18. The UNFCCC’s information collection obligations may yet become be its most critical contribution to GHG abatements. See Jane Ellis & Sara Moarif, Identifying and Addressing Gaps in the UNFCCC Reporting Framework 27 (OECD, Paper No. 2015(7), 2015),
https://www.transparency-partnership.net/sites/default/files/u2402/identifying-andaddressing-gaps.pdf (noting that many of the information streams needed to assess progress
under the Paris Agreement were already expected of so-called “Annex I” states under the
UNFCCC).
19. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(a)-(c).
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tific knowledge.”20 As section C shows, this may be the most consequential legacy of the UNFCCC to date. Finally, the parties established the annual COPs.21
The annual COPs began in 1995 in Berlin where the Kyoto Protocol was first conceived.22 In the quarter century since, the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ standard for the pursuit of
Río’s collective goal became more impediment than pathway to the
global abatement of GHG emissions.23 As our science gradually clarified the nature of GHGs as an aggregating, cumulative pollutant,24 as
well as the probable consequences of global emissions growth,25 the
parties came to understand just how profound the needed changes to
business-as-usual (BAU) were—as well as the complexity of the collective action problem that collective change from BAU would be.26
In a nutshell, a majority of the pollutant stocks already in the atmosphere were put there by one set of parties while the majority of projected emissions would likely be put there by another set. Beset by

20. UNFCCC article 12 obliged each signatory to create and maintain a “national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of [the principal
GHGs] . . . to the extent its capacities permit.” UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 12(1)(a). It also
obliged them to report to other parties “[a] detailed description of the policies and measures
… adopted” as well as a “specific estimate of the effects that [such policies and measures]
will have on anthropogenic emissions….” Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).
21. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
22. BARRETT, supra note 11, at 369.
23. As Professor Stone observed, the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 endorsed “taking
into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any
costs which may emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards,” opening a rift
in the diplomatic world between “developing” and “developed” nations that has come to define most multilateral environmental treaty since. Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 276, 279 (2004). And, as
nations have disagreed over which is a “developed” and which a “developing” nation—with
only the former being saddled economically costly obligations—the measures implemented
protecting the environment have too often faltered. See id. at 279–81.
24. DAVID ARCHER & STEFAN RAHMSTORF, THE CLIMATE CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 17–32 (2010).
25. The so-called “transient climate response to cumulative emissions” (TCRE) has
been plotted as a global average surface temperature change per unit of total cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Joeri Rogelj et al., Differences Between Carbon Budget Estimates Unraveled, 6 NATURE CLIM. CHANGE 245, 245 (2016). That plot corresponds strongly
to observed temperature changes to date and, assuming no nonlinearities, predict continued
temperature change as well. Id. The problematic assumption is that the TCRE will continue
uninterrupted, i.e., without encountering some nonlinearity. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
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the same forces that had gridlocked so many other major international
institutions,27 the imbalanced COPs’ prospects grew increasingly
dim.28
The Kyoto Protocol was built from a premise of
fault/responsibility. It aimed to saddle roughly three dozen highconsumption economies with onerous abatement duties while leaving
the majority of projected future emissions (by then-low consumption
countries) ungoverned.29 After the high-consumption economies
mostly passed on signing, global emissions continued to increase at
about their historic rate of 1.9 percent annually (doubling approximately every thirty-five years).30 Thus, in practical effect Kyoto
changed only a tiny fraction of global emissions.31 With global temperature change approximately linearly related to cumulative CO2
emissions,32 it grew increasingly evident that responsibility and fault
were no solution.33
At Kyoto’s sunset in 2012, the UNFCCC convention/protocol
model had come to epitomize the trade-off breadth of commitment
makes in the depth of that commitment. In Kyoto’s wake, the annual
conferences of parties struggled to identify some other means of
specifying the obligation(s) to abate GHG emissions.34 Customary
international law has long prohibited the use of one’s territory to
harm other states through pollution.35 But the causation dimensions
27. See, e.g., THOMAS HALE ET AL., GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING
WHEN WE NEED IT MOST 251–69 (2013); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE
CHANGE JUSTICE 10–40 (2010).
28. HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 257–60; POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 190.
29. DIETER HELM, THE CARBON CRUNCH 40–55 (2012).
30. R.J. Andres et al., A Synthesis of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion, 9 BIOGEOSCIENCES 1845, 1854 (2012).
31. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS
FOR A WARMING WORLD 247 (2013).
32. H. Damon Matthews et al., The Proportionality of Global Warming to Cumulative
Carbon Emissions, 459 NATURE 829, 830 (2009).
33. The lack of “developed,” high-consumption economies ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) led to a prompt reevaluation and eventual amendment
thereof, accommodating their concerns. See Robin R. Churchill, The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 24, 26–
27 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015).
34. See Wirth, supra note 15, at 521–23; HALE ET AL., supra note 28, at 260–63; HELM,
supra note 29, at 50–72; NORDHAUS, supra note 31, at 316–26. The conventional economic
wisdom has long been that discussions of climate fairness and justice must yield to the social
“pricing” of carbon emissions. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); POSNER &
WEISBACH, supra note 27. For many reasons, the COP has never adopted this conventional
wisdom and, as Parts III and IV argue, neither did Paris.
35. See, e.g., Redgwell, supra note 13, at 695 (calling this the “no harm” principle of

COLBURN

188

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:6

alone have prevented that norm’s application to GHGs, while the diffusion of responsibilities attending causation that is so ubiquitous yet
indirect worsen matters still.36 Relative national wealth, technological advantage, cumulative versus projected emissions, and many other criteria divided the subsequent COPs, blocking any agreement on
specific abatement duties.37 What constituted a “developed” nation
supposedly able to pivot a growth-oriented economy off of fossil
fuels through concerted national action as opposed to one in dire need
of any productive activity became a distinction rooted more in motivation than in evidence or principle.38 To some, the experience confirmed how coalition-building (breadth) invariably lessened the depth
of commitments.39 To others, it underscored the corrosive effects of
self-interest and the incentives to free-ride on whatever efforts to protect a global commons others might make.40 Though COP-21 negotiators studiously avoided talk of a carbon budget,41 Section B explains
how the Paris signatories created precisely that.

customary international law).
36. BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 198–99.
37. Wirth, supra note 15, at 524–27; ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 13 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N.
Stavins eds. 2007). It is far from clear that national wealth averaged over an entire populace
reflects much concern for fairness. See Shoibal Chakravarty et al., Sharing Global CO2
Emissions Reductions Among One Billion High Emitters, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
11884 (2009).
38. Where the UNFCCC had stated that “[t]he specific needs and special circumstances
of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change . . . should be given full consideration,” UNFCCC, supra note 1,
art. 3(2), the Kyoto Protocol divided most of the states-parties into two annexes—only one
of which (comprising 38 nations) faced mandatory mitigation. See Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 16, arts. 2, 3 & annex I.
39. POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 63–72; cf. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 736–83
(1999) (arguing that “voluntary assent” voting rules have unique advantages in negotiating
international GHG constraints). See also GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE
76–86 (2000) (providing an argument that Kyoto’s heavy reliance on tradeable allowances in
the land use sector created, in light of the profound uncertainties and variabilities thereof,
cross-cutting influences on many of its signatories).
40. See, e.g., SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS 74–102 (2007); William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding
in International Climate Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339, 1341–43 (2015).
41. Justin Gillis, Pledges to Cut Emissions Lag as Climate Talks Get Underway, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2015, at A1.

COLBURN

2019]

A FUTURE FOR PARIS?

189

B. Mitigation: What Kind of Good?
A public good is a good the provision of which is to all equally
or not at all.42 There are few truly public goods in this sense.43 A
collective good where individual consumption is independent of (collective) provision merely entails some risk that the good’s providers
will “defect” and seek to consume it without contributing to its supply.44 If climate mitigation as such is a good, it is a collective good.
With no global sovereign, moreover, it is one that neither price nor
quantity tools alone can supply.45 With GHG emissions so long identified with economic expansion (“growth”), emissions abatement efforts have long been thought to create their own perverse incentive:
the more effective the collective effort, the bigger the incentive to
free-ride on it.46 And as different streams of quantitative work converged on the conclusion that success in mitigation meant eradicating
practically all fossil fuel consumption,47 mitigation began to seem
like a good of unprecedented cost.48
42. Thus, “[g]lobal public goods offer benefits that are both non-excludable and nonrival. Once provided, no country can be prevented from enjoying a global public good; nor
can any country’s enjoyment of the good impinge on the consumption opportunities of other
countries.” BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?, supra note 40, at 1.
43. See, e.g., William Barnett II & Walter Block, Coase and Van Zandt on Lighthouses,
35 PUB. FIN. REV. 710 (2007). Indeed, of the truly public goods existing in theory, identifying the actual demand therefore may be impossible, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954), at least if voters/consumers
are not free to do so ‘with their feet.’ See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
44. A “public good,” thus, entails these risks by definition. But economists have had a
hard time deciding whether GHG emission abatements—or the environmental effects they
might bring—are or are not public goods in this sense. The importance of excludability has
long been known, see, for example, James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32
ECONOMICA 1 (1965), as has that of rivalrous consumption. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: THEORY TO PRACTICE 3 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2005). But the “consumption” of a good like mitigation continues to defy simple categorizations. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
45. See Wiener, supra note 39, at 701–34; Scott Barrett, Credible Commitments, Focal
Points, and Tipping, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND COMMON SENSE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TOM
SCHELLING 29, 29–30 (Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph eds., 2012).
46. See, e.g., Nordhaus, Climate Clubs, supra note 40, at 1339–40. As more nations
restrict emissions, market operations that cannot abate their emissions will, to some unknown extent, seek out more favorable jurisdictions, thereby “exiting” (or “leaking”) from
the jurisdictions restricting their emissions. On this form of “regulatory competition,” see
DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND
PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2004).
47. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
48. A public (or collective) good that is planetary is scale, while of ordinary theoretical
difficulty for expected utility theorists, see, e.g., ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 29–30 (4th ed. 1932), has proven extraordinarily challenging as a matter of practi-
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This picture of emissions as externalized cost and the abatement
thereof as (global) collective good invites a still more troubling inference on emissions abatement and climate disruption. Any state can
act to reduce the costs to its public from climate disruption by investing in capacities to adapt, i.e., providing collective goods of adaptation. Nations differ in how well and/or quickly they may do so. Nations also differ in how, when, and to what degree they may be
burdened by failing to adapt.49 Yet they also differ in their capacities
to contribute to mitigation, either because they do not currently and
will not in the coming decades contribute very much to cumulative
emissions,50 or because reducing their own emissions would be extraordinarily costly to their electorates and, thus, not likely to be undertaken or sustained. Finally, the reverse holds true as well: a nation
can be exceptionally well-positioned to contribute to mitigation.51 If
collective obligations imposed at an international level are viewed
domestically as the opposite of self-government,52 though, mitigate/adapt choices present particularly stark contrasts in how public
resources are allocated.
A source of structural uncertainty in our estimations of Earth’s
future climate must be mentioned: potential nonlinearities severing
future conditions from what, to date at least, has been a predictable
climate response to cumulative emissions.53 There is no baseline
cal problem-solving. See GERNOT WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, CLIMATE SHOCK: THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A HOTTER PLANET (2015); BARRETT, supra note 13, at 369–91;
Joseph E. Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 374–78 (2003).
49. It is becoming increasingly clear that virtually all nations would face extreme costs
of adaptation eventually. Camilo Mora et al., Broad Threat to Humanity from Cumulative
Climate Hazards Intensified by Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
1062 (2018).
50. TCRE calculations treat every ton of emitted carbon, regardless of location or timing, as equal. See generally Myles R. Allen et al., Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon
Emissions Towards the Trillionth Tonne, 458 NATURE 1163 (2009). Thus, national decisions
to emit/abate become a kind of “mirrored externality.” Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels,
Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 155 (2014).
51. A small number of states that could contribute disproportionately to mitigation
would be reason to prefer some distributions of emissions abatement over others. Wiener,
supra note 39, at 771–77.
52. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law,
33 UCLA L. REV . 665, 669–70, 717–23 (1986).
53. ARCHER & RAHMSTORF, supra note 24, at 132. Thus, entirely apart from the distortions inherent in viewing global climate disruption as an aggregate temperature average, id.
at 133, progress on “equilibrium” climate sensitivity has been minimal and will remain minimal at least until some major nonlinearity actually occurs. Gerard H. Roe & Marcia B.
Baker, Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318 SCI. 629 (2007) (arguing that the
strength of any “feedback factor” in climate change predictions is likely to be unknowable
and perhaps not that useful supposing it was known).
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necessarily held in common among all nations party to the UNFCCC
from which to differentiate duties to one’s people either to adapt or to
mitigate. This captures some of the turbulence in various nations’
stances on mitigation stringency. When demography and time intersect, social welfare calculations can grow unstable,54 generating considerable turnover in elected governments’ views on adaptation and
mitigation. We might call this the trap of ‘common but differentiated
responsibilities’ in the production of this particular collective good.55
Of course, self-preservation is often the common denominator in
international relations.56 Kyoto made that seem synonymous with inaction on mitigation,57 especially as the many uncertainties about optimal mitigation were further isolated.58 Indeed, the trap was there
for anyone aiming to analyze the social costs of adaptation, mitigation, or how the two should be balanced in some “average” or standard state or to derive international legal duties from orthodox theories
of state responsibility, social welfare accounting, etc.59 COP-20 and
54. Because the focal metric is cumulative emissions, delaying emissions by even a
decade or more is not necessarily contributing materially to mitigation. And, unfortunately,
projecting present reason balancing into the distant future – where unborn generations’
health and welfare are the source of value—has remained an intractable ethical problem despite generations of patient study. TIM MULGAN, FUTURE PEOPLE 7–8 (2006).
55. Cf. Stone, supra note 23, at 298 (noting that of the 186 nations that ratified the
UNFCCC, only 25 saddled with mitigation duties by the Kyoto Protocol ratified it and that,
of the 16 top emitters, only 6 representing 16.4% of total emissions did so); see also Aldy et
al., supra note 48, at 374–80.
56. Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 103–28 (1979) (arguing that the ordering principle of international relations is anarchy and that self-preservation
and expansion explain most states’ motives). Paradoxically, probabilistic modeling of “structural” uncertainties like equilibrium climate sensitivity can result in essentially unconstrained
willingness to pay to avoid expected harms. See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1
(2009). But in that case, of course, the analysis will undermine its own practical value to present-day decision-makers.
57. Barrett, supra note 45, at 37–39.
58. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS,
CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 105–58 (2011) (collecting
projections of expected changes in extreme precipitation and temperatures, loss of permafrost and snowpack, ocean acidification, sea level rise and their variations by global region).
As Freeman and colleagues argue, the IPCC’s lowering of its likely lower bound in the expected temperature gain range in 2013, paradoxically, was actually bad news for the
UNFCCC parties because all it did was confirm an increase in the expected variance in future warming estimates. Mark C. Freeman, Gernot Wagner & Richard Zeckhauser, Climate
Sensitivity Uncertainty: When Is Good News Bad? (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements,
Discussion Paper No. 15-76, 2015), http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/dp76_freemanwagner-zeckhauser-2.pdf.
59. Responsibilities of this kind can, in other words, diverge in direction. See
Chakravarty et al., supra note 37, at 11886 (arguing that pursuing mitigation “and meeting
the basic energy needs of the global poor are nearly decoupled objectives”); POSNER &
WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 179 (“The only way to ensure broad participation is to design
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COP-21 finally found a path around this trap, although its ultimate
arc will remain open to question for decades to come. They created a
treaty60 combining pledges,61 i.e., individually-determined contributions to mitigation,62 with legal duties: (1) to help develop adaptation
technologies;63 (2) to track progress to those ends while disclosing
that progress, or lack thereof, broadly;64 and (3) to contribute to the
collective goal of “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue
efforts to limit the temperature to increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the
risks and impacts of climate change.”65 The UNFCCC’s nebulous
goal of avoiding “dangerous” climate change was, in that much, sup-

an agreement so that all nations are better off”). State-state relations rarely conform to simple principles. Cf. David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on International Order, 125 YALE L.J. 618, 622 (2016) (contrasting the “cosmopolitan legal theory”
of Kant wherein state responsibility is measured by universal principles with the “Hobbesian
realism” of rule by superior force).
60. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes it clear that the Paris Agreement is a treaty governed by the public international law of treaties. See Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232. The United States signed
Vienna but the Senate never ratified it. See Evan J. Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 442–48 (2004). Nonetheless, Article 26 codified customary international law known since antiquity as pacta sunt
servanda: the keeping of promises in good faith. See id. at 447, n.72 (“[E]very American
court to address the Vienna Convention’s legal authority has concluded that its provisions
express binding customary norms.”); Maglosia Fitzmaurice, The Practical Working of the
Law of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 172, 181–82 (Malcolm Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).
61. We might characterize all international agreements as either legally binding “contracts” or non-binding accords similar in function to “pledges.” See Kal Raustiala, Form and
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 586 (2005). Of course, any
particular treaty or convention can combine both as the parties desire, but “[t]he choice between pledge and contract is a choice between employing and avoiding law.” Id. at 590.
62. See Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 3, 4(3). The agreement states that “all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts . . . with the view to achieving the
purpose of th[e] Agreement as set out in Article 2,” which includes the temperature constraint. Id. art. 3.
63. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 9, 10.
64. Id. art. 13. A mixture of “pledges” and “contracts” in Raustiala’s terminology has
led some to characterize Paris as the joinder of “hard” and “soft” (as well as several “non-”)
obligations. See, e.g., Lavanya Rajamani, The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between
Hard, Soft, and Non-Obligations, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 337 (2016).
65. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts 2(1)(a). “Parties” also declared the “aim to
reach global peaking of [GHG] emissions as soon as possible,” id. art. 4(1), although nothing
more specific to individual parties followed that expressed “aim.”

COLBURN

2019]

A FUTURE FOR PARIS?

193

planted with a quantified and verifiable global target.66 However, the
agreement also ordered all of the foregoing into regularized collective
reviews—periodic global “stock-takes”—beginning in 2023.67
Although this pledge/review model left the setting of national
mitigation targets to each signatory’s choosing and avoided talk of
state responsibility for missed targets,68 it ensured that the broad scrutiny thereof, along with the development of adaptation capacities and
continued collective pursuit of the hard temperature limit, were hard
commitments.69 “[T]he vast majority of Parties were keen that the
2015 agreement, many years in the making, take the form of a legally
binding instrument.”70 Thus, even though Article 4(4)’s economywide emissions-cutting pledges are prefaced by a “should” (not a
“shall”),71 much of the rest of the agreement is, by parity of reasoning, mandatory.72 As the 2016 election showed, even that much of a
binding commitment to mitigate was too much to sustain politically
in Washington.73 The tide of legal commentary74 and opposition
66. See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. The 2°C goal has a long, disputed
history in climate change talks. See Mark New et al., Four Degrees and Beyond: The Potential for a Global Temperature Increase of Four Degrees and Its Implications, 369 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL & ENG’G SCIS. 6, 7–8 (2011) (noting that 2°C goal came together in the late 1990s as a reflection of two sets of beliefs: that
harmful impacts were thought to start accumulating quickly moving from 2°C to 3°C and
that limiting average warming to 2°C could be accomplished without dire or extraordinary
costs). Some have argued that it dates to the 1970s, well before the Río summit. See Samuel
Randalls, History of the 2°C Climate Target, 1 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 598, 599–601
(2010).
67. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 14.
68. Susan Biniaz, Comma But Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 other Ways Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime, 6
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 37, 51–57 (2016).
69. With the exception of the 2°C goal, each of these obligations is couched with a
mandatory “shall.” See Rajamani, supra note 64, at 344–51 tbl. 1. Both internationally, see
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 31, and domestically, an instrument’s legally binding character is to be gauged by the expressed intent of the parties.
See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(3) (2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
301 (1987).
70. Rajamani, supra note 64, at 340.
71. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(4). The normative operators “should” and
“shall” featured prominently in the Paris talks according to those familiar with the negotiations. Biniaz, supra note 68, at 52.
72. Rajamani, supra note 64, tbl. 1, at 344–51.
73. One economist estimated that achieving the Paris pledge could cost the US between
$3.3 and $6 trillion in new energy generating capacity, storage, and transmission investments
between now and 2050. Geoffrey Heal, What Would it Take to Reduce US Greenhouse Gas
Emissions 80% by 2050? (Columbia Bus. Sch., NBER Working Paper No. 22525, 2016),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22525. That was remarkably similar to the price several
economists once put on the Kyoto Protocol. John P. Weyant & Jennifer Hill, Introduction
and Overview: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, 20 ENERGY J.
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venom unleashed on the agreement—even though the text was unequivocal75—instantly polarized COP21 and America’s pledge in the
public sphere.
Of course, some of the United States’ most consequential treaties have taken the form of a pledge.76 The global average temperature goals in the Paris agreement were almost certainly both aspirational and carefully qualified in their precise meanings.77 Though
some maintain that this shows Paris “rests more on economic, social,
and political obligation than it does on legal authority,”78 Paris’ real
wedge for changing present trajectories was always its successful attraction of so many credible commitments to mitigate collectively
notwithstanding the clear, increasingly urgent incentives to adapt
one’s national economy and populace.79 Credibility of commitments
to mitigate can only be measured in soft variables like contracts,
firms, inertia, culture, leadership, etc.80 However, the credibility of
vii, at vii, xii (1999).
74. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25(2)
REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 16, 16–22 (2016); David A. Wirth, Cracking the American Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law and the Paris Agreement, 6
CLIMATE L. 152, 166–70 (2016); Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+,
49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2016). A mitigation pledge that is non-binding need not be
submitted to the U.S. Senate for its ratification pursuant to Article II, § 2. Wirth, supra note
15, at 543–45.
75. Paris calls on parties to “pursue domestic mitigation measures” with the “aim of
achieving the objectives of such contributions,” Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(2), and
the COP-21 “decision” invites contributions “towards achieving the objective of the
[UNFCCC] as set out in its Article 2. Article 2 states that the UNFCCC’s “ultimate objective” is the “stabilization of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” UNFCCC, supra
note 1, art. 2.
76. DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM (2001). “The Helsinki Accords, which included
human rights provisions, altered the behavior of groups in civil society in eastern Europe,
much to the dismay and surprise of their Communist overlords, who had signed because they
believed that the provisions of the accord dealing with borders and economic exchange
would strengthen their position.” STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY 32 (1999).
77. Andrew P. Schurer et al., Importance of the Pre-Industrial Baseline for Likelihood
of Exceeding Paris Goals, 7 NATURE CLIM. CH. 563, 563-64 (2017).
78. Jennifer Jacquet & Dale Jamieson, Soft But Significant Power in the Paris Agreement, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 643, 645 (2016).
79. Cf. ALINA AVERCHENKOVA & SAMUELA BASSI, BEYOND THE TARGETS :
ASSESSING THE POLITICAL CREDIBILITY OF PLEDGES FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2016)
(finding that, among G-20 nations, INDCs were generally credible measured by the domestic
institutions and factors bearing on the pledges being implemented).
80. Cf. AVERCHENKOVA & BASSI, supra note 79, at 9–10 (tracking the “multiple dimensions” of a nation’s INDC “credibility” into four main elements: rules and procedures,
players and organizations, norms and public opinion, and past performance).
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the pledges to apply best efforts is nonetheless their most important
property, as Section C explains, and one to which domestic mitigation efforts must pay close attention.
C. Game of Assurances: Achieving Collective Mitigation
In game-theoretic terms, policy-induced mitigation that does not
simply push emissions to non-mitigating places or times presents a
kind of assurances problem.81 Globalized supply chains, capital
flows, and trading norms all, at least in theory, make “leakage”
around or beyond a policy easier than ever.82 In reality, there is no
telling what frictions any given firm in a specific time and place faces
in shifting the site(s) of its operations,83 nor how readily free capital
will flow across legal borders.84 There are precious few ways to
model or otherwise compute average or standardized answers to these
questions that would be useful to decision-makers. Decarbonization
in that environment must find ways to bridge the deep uncertainties

81. The assurance problem goes beyond the ubiquitous single-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma
to the regularity of “substantial voluntary contributions to public goods without outside enforcement” wherein the decision problem is the matter of degrees—turning on an ability to
predict others’ behaviors “subject to varying limits of confidence.” Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154,
157, 162 (1984). That analysis begins from three assumptions. First, that “[w]herever benefits and costs are a function of the total actions of the group, it [is] implausible that decisions
to contribute are unaffected by expectations of the decisions of others.” Id. at 160. Second,
when payoffs are a function of joint choice (as with most public goods problems), wherever
expectations are not coordinated, each player’s choice of strategy is secondary to the correct
prediction of every other player’s choices. Id. at 161. This is so because enhancing mutual
predictability allows the players to optimize their own contributions. Id. Third, whether others will or will not contribute is a probabilistic judgment, dependent upon the information
held by each player. Id. at 166.
82. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness
of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132
(1995).
83. See id. (finding that there is no conclusive evidence of “regulatory competition”
pulling firms out of the US because of its stringent environmental controls). Cf. MURPHY,
supra note 46, at 242–54 (finding from over a dozen detailed case studies that factor balancing by individual firms and interests is shaped by a multitude of influences, many of them
impossible to quantify, and that site-shifting (or “reflagging”) is growing harder to predict as
regulatory cooperation increases).
84. Jaffe et al., supra note 82, at 137; see also Derek K. Kellenberger, An Empirical
Investigation of the Pollution Haven Effect with Strategic Environment and Trade Policy, 78
J. INT’L ECON. 242 (2009); Yuquing Xing & Charles D. Kolstad, Do Lax Environmental
Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2002); Werner
Antweiler et al., Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (2001).
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of trade exposure, long- and short-term dealing, fluid supply chains,
and how all of it functions in fast-changing markets.85 Stringency
confronts an endless maze of localized specifics, in short.
This dilemma hardens as the number of relevant parties expands.
The larger a coalition providing a good like climate mitigation, the
less perceptibly effective the median contribution is, diminishing
eventually to imperceptibility.86 This helps to explain Paris’ detailed
reporting obligations, its unique “enhanced transparency framework,”87 and its step-wise approach to stringency.88 If imperceptibility in contributing is easily mistaken for negligibility,89 Paris’ architects understood that threat. A pledge need never be rescinded—
leaving states’ electorates otherwise prone to turn out their elected
governments just as they were without the pledge.90 But Paris’ use of
a temperature constraint to define the global collective good informed
such individuated and soft obligations and, thus, the contributions.
Finally, the agreement took full account of the temporal dimension in the pledge/review model. If there has been one certainty in
estimating China’s total GHG emissions it is that the estimates are
soft and subject to revision—sometimes considerable revision.91 But
China is not alone.92 Estimating quantities at such scales and scope
has proven extraordinarily challenging everywhere.93 After years of
data crunching, the United States is thought by many to have reduced
85. Cf. Tim Jeppesen, John A. List & Henk Folmer, Environmental Regulations and
New Plant Location Decisions: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, 42 J. REGIONAL SCI. 19
(2002). Jeppesen and colleagues found that factors besides regulation account more directly
for site-shifting decisions in many sectors. Id.
86. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 44 (1965).
87. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 13.
88. Pivotal to Paris’s graduated approach to mitigation stringency are its periodic
“stock-takings,” which are to “assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose”
of the Agreement. Id. art. 14(1).
89. RICHARD TUCK, FREE-RIDING 12–14 (2008).
90. As Geoffrey Brennan has shown, the notion of contribution imperceptibility is
vague, especially where selective incentives are available and motivational changes can result regardless of a contribution’s causal efficacy. Geoffrey Brennan, Olson and Imperceptible Differences: The Tuck Critique, 164 PUB. CHOICE 235, 242–44 (2015).
91. Jan Ivar Korsbakken et al., Uncertainties Around Reductions in China’s Coal Use
and CO2 Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 687, 687 (2016) (noting a 3% aggregate
reduction by weight in national coal consumption, followed by a later estimation of an insignificant increase in total coal-derived energy use for the same period, from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics and concluding that interpreting Chinese coal statistics has been
complicated severely by retrospective revisions, altered methods, inconsistent reporting).
92. Corinne Le Quéré et al., Global Carbon Budget 2015, 7 EARTH SYS. SCI. DATA 349,
358–59 (2015).
93. Id. Even putting aside the land use sectors, fossil fuel combustion and the GHG intensities thereof have proven remarkably variable. Id. at 358–59.
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the “carbon intensity” of its energy production and consumption over
the last decade.94 Without precise and accurate estimates of a long
list of quantities, though, it is exceedingly difficult to track market responses to policy inducements, i.e., to know whether “leakage”
around or beyond policy tools is occurring and where.95 Because
slackening U.S. demand for internationally traded goods might just
enable their consumption elsewhere, usable intelligence is still too often unavailable when it is needed.
The full experience with the Kyoto Protocol proved more than
wide participation’s importance to stringent mitigation and mitigation
counting, though.96 It proved that knowing how to target consumption in one quarter without that consumption leaking to other quarters
or to a later quarter is a severe challenge in an increasingly globalized
economy.97 Tracking land use changes over time, for example, it revealed many more accounting obstacles than had been understood at
first.98 During that same time, after some early models estimating the
costs of GHG abatements were converging to a common conclusion
showing delay as the key to minimizing abatement costs,99 it emerged
that those models did not allow for induced technical change from
94. See, e.g., John Larsen et al., Taking Stock: Progress Toward Meeting Climate
Goals, RHODIUM GRP . (Jan. 28, 2016), http://rhg.com/reports/progress-toward-meeting-usclimate-goals (“We estimate that US carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption in
2015 were 11% below 2005 levels.”). This is not to say that it has reduced its GHG emissions by absolute quantity.
95. See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 82, at 157–58. Even starting with the so-called
“second generation” of empirical studies tracking loss of economic starts and/or capital from
environmental controls, the results seem to be impossible to derive without extensive longitudinal data sets. See Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 64 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1669, 1683–94 (2014).
96. Cf. BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 255–60 (noting that, to properly evaluate Kyoto
Protocol for its effectiveness, we should compare what actually happened under the protocol
to what would have occurred without it but that Kyoto did “little to slow [the] trend” of annual 1.9% growth rates in GHG emissions over the decades climate disruption has been a
global problem).
97. Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal “Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 591 (2009) (describing the common challenges fossil fuel markets in different jurisdictions confront when regulators have attempted to quantify actual emissions averted by
their rules); Michael P. Vandenberg & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance:
Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 221 (2010); H. Scott Matthews et al., The
Importance of Carbon Footprint Estimation Boundaries, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5839
(2008).
98. Sandro Federici et al., New Estimated of CO2 Forest Emissions and Removals:
1990-2015, 352 FOREST ECOLOGY & MNGMT. 89, 92 (2015) (finding from reanalysis that
forest lands over the period in question were a net source of CO2 emissions globally, averaging 1.52Gt CO2 per year).
99. See, e.g., John P. Weyant, Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions, 7 J. ECON.
PERSP. 27, 34–42 (1993); NORDHAUS, supra note 31, at 227–32.
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carbon-intensive to carbon-free energy sources.100 Because cumulative global emissions are the focal metric,101 sham estimates for
‘planning purposes’ are not just a waste of time: they diminish the
confidence of partners whose own mitigation contributions will be
vital to success.102
The inversion of gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the
high consumption to the low consumption economies that many have
forecasted for this century103 punctuates this need to prevent mere
site-shifting of carbon-intensive production/consumption as mitigation efforts ramp upwards.104 In this context, virtually any public initiative authority that can be used to induce technological innovation
away from carbon-intensivity can be vital.105 Thus, Paris’ iterative
pledge/review model treats GHGs’ accumulation in the atmosphere
as a cumulative carbon constraint—several parameters of which had
already been calculated in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report of 2015 (AR5) and which
now fall into a widely known probability distribution.106 Most peerreviewed estimates in literature find that this cumulative constraint
will require global emissions to peak soon and fall to negative CO2
emissions by the second half of the century.107 Because the first generation NDCs were so clearly insufficient to that end, assuming the
100. Michael Grubb et al., Induced Technical Change in Energy and Environment Modeling: Analytical Approaches and Policy Implications, 27 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENV’T 271,
293 (2002) (“Some models (e.g., Nordhaus) have just one aggregate energy-carbon sector
with no opportunity for substitution toward non-carbon sources. Perhaps not surprisingly,
these generate a modest response to induced technical change.”). With the possibility of induced substitution of low- for high-carbon energy, the model results changed dramatically.
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder & Stephen H. Schneider, Induced Technological Change and
the Attractiveness of CO2 Abatement Policies, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 211 (1999).
101. See supra text accompanying note 24.
102. Cf. BARRETT, supra note 11, at 150 (noting the “problematic” nature of Kyoto’s
self-reporting and verification scheme).
103. Structural trends seem likely to deliver the GDP inversion throughout this century.
See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 321-22 (2016).
104. Aldy et al., supra note 48, at 375.
105. David A. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies
to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 844 (2008).
106. The Fifth Assessment report concluded that to have a 66% chance of holding to no
more than 2°C global average warming, no more than 2900 gigatons cumulative CO2
equivalent could be emitted. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 10 (2015) https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/675
31/metadc950248/m2/1/high_res_d/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf. That left 800-1000
gigatons remaining as of 2015. Id.
107. Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al., Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris
Agreement Temperature Goal, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 827, 831 (2016); Hal Harvey et
al., A Trillion Tons, 142(1) DÆDALUS 8, 9–11 (2013).
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signatories can hold the deal together and agree on common carbon
“budgeting” frameworks,108 Paris’ subsequent commitment periods
have become the Rubicon, spotlighting the importance of mitigation
stringency over time.
If a joint and cumulative carbon constraint is to harden over
time, Paris’ signatories must meet the major challenges of economic
leakage and the maintenance of collective assurances on stringency.
If contributors’ decisions turn even indirectly on their expectations of
others’ mitigation,109 though, they must be able to tell the difference
between contributing and free-riding.110 And that is no easy task.
For example, the United States is assumed to have bent the curve on
its GHG emission intensities through its push for installed wind and
solar capacity over the last decade.111 However, the low GDP growth
and tax credits subsidizing existing technologies that created that
wedge are deeply contingent: the tax credits will phase out and current renewables cannot compete without subsidy.112 Fossil fuel production has proven singularly protean, market adaptive,113 and adroit
at attracting political allies both big and small.114 What should a trading partner like China or the European Union expect of the United
States over the next decade or two? There is no doubting US leaders’

108. Even assuming the IPCC AR5’s projections, there are importantly different ways to
“budget” the GHG emissions that remain consistent with Paris’s temperature goals. Joeri
Rogelj et al., Differences Between Carbon Budget Estimates Unravelled, 6 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 245, 246–478 (2016). The principal divides are between “threshold exceedance”
versus “threshold avoidance” budget types, id. at 246–47, and between single gas (CO2) and
multi-gas (all principal GHGs) models (which can be used in either budget type). Id. at 248–
50.
109. Orthodox game theory situates these dynamics in a “cooperative,” as opposed to a
conflictual framework, although the presence or absence of thresholds or “tipping points”
can easily dominate such an analysis. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 87–98 (2d ed. 2006); see also Joseph E. Aldy, The Crucial Role of Policy
Surveillance in International Climate Policy, 126 CLIMATIC CHANGE 279 (2014) (regarding
pledges to mitigate and the coordinating role played by the Paris Agreement’s “enhanced
transparency framework”).
110. Runge, supra note 81, at 175–76.
111. See, e.g., John Larsen et al., supra note 94, at 2–4.
112. HELM, supra note 29, at 75–99; John Larsen et al., supra note 94, at 3–8. Conventional wisdom has long been (and remains) that, barring a major technological breakthrough
in storage technology, wind and solar will not be “grid competitive” wherever fossil fuel
prices can be set by supply and demand. See, e.g., SCOTT L. MONTGOMERY, THE POWERS
THAT BE: GLOBAL ENERGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND 153–57 (2010).
113. Thomas Covert et al., Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?, 30 J. ECON. PERSP.
117, 126–34 (2016); John M. DeCicco, The Liquid Carbon Challenge: Evolving Views on
Transportation Fuels and Climate, 4 WIRES ENERGY ENV’T 98, 98–99 (2015).
114. See, e.g., Eliza Griswold, Undermined: A Local Activist Fights for the Future of
Coal Country, NEW YORKER MAG., July 3, 2017, at 48.
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political incentives to maximize consumption.115 Chinese and EU
leaders surely share those same incentives.116 Given the US economy’s immense capacity for mitigation, giving other nations a reason
to trust in policy stringency is a critical part of reducing mitigation’s
overall cost in Paris’ subsequent commitment periods.117 If initial indications are any guide, mitigation in both the United States and European Union are lagging far behind expectations.118
Unlike certain collective goods, climate change mitigation’s
“consumption” is not “rivalrous.”119 Indeed, it is unlike the “consumption” of goods or services at all.120 Most of the beneficiaries of
this collective forbearance have yet to be born and, indeed, might not
be born if nations of the world were to constrain their own demographic growth.121 In all events, 2°C will affect Paris’ signatories

115. TIM JACKSON, PROSPERITY WITHOUT GROWTH: ECONOMICS FOR A FINITE PLANET 3
(1st ed. 2011) (arguing that in most mature economies like the US’s, rising per capita GDP is
thought of as equivalent to increasing prosperity and, for that reason, GDP growth “has been
the single most important policy goal across the world for most of the last century”).
116. The EU pledged in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP-15) to cut its emissions by 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to
comparable emissions reductions.” BARRETT, supra note 40, at 206. In its inaugural NDC for
Paris the EU committed to cutting by 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. European Commission, 2030 climate and energy framework, EUROPA (last visited May 2, 2019)
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en. However, the EU pledges were predicated in no small part on an expectation of slowing member economies—a trend its leaders
would like desperately to reverse. See David G. Victor et al., Prove Paris Was More than
Paper Promises, 548 NATURE 25, 25–27 (2017).
117. Most economists have concluded that that remains severe under-investment in mitigation globally. Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph, Thinking Through the Climate Change
Challenge, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND COMMON SENSE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TOM
SCHELLING 3, 12 (Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph eds., 2012) (listing as the first item in a
“Schelling consensus on climate change policy” that governments have “significantly underinvested in mitigation relative to the level of effort that would be economically efficient from
a global perspective”).
118. Jeffrey B. Greenblatt & Max Wei, Assessment of the Climate Commitments and
Additional Mitigation Policies of the United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1090, 1092
(2016) (finding from modeling 17 different policies additional reductions will be needed to
reach US NDC’s 2025 goals); Victor et al., supra note 116, at 26.
119. Cf. Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Fifty Years Later, 164 PUB. CHOICE 195, 200
(2015) (observing that Mancur Olson’s propositions on the provision of collective goods assumed that the good’s consumption was “rivalrous” in that shares decreased in proportion to
the group size’s increase).
120. If mitigation choices arise before localized consequences of future climate sensitivities can be backed out of the “general circulation models” (GCMs) on which the IPCC and
UNFCCC COPs rely, they may be severely compromised by how costly, complex, and uncertain the derivation of local consequences will remain. Michael C. Runge et al., Detecting
Failure of Climate Predictions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 861, 861–62 (2016).
121. See, e.g., JOHN BROOME, CLIMATE MATTERS: ETHICS IN A WARMING WORLD 156
(2012).
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quite differently.122 Replacing the avoidance of “dangerous” climate
change with the hard limit of 2°C total average warming at least has
the potential to sharpen the obligatory tone of Paris’s commitments.123
Still, tradeoffs between public expenditures for adaptation and
those for mitigation are seemingly inevitable124 given adaptation’s
capacity to lower any jurisdiction’s costs of collective failures to mitigate.125 Indeed, the types and pace of adaptation investments are
projected to vary tremendously depending on the degree to which
mitigation succeeds or fails.126 Thus, adaptation is hardly “defection”
in the game-theoretic sense, even as this interactivity of a signatory’s
response options after Paris severely complicates the assessment of
pledge credibility and, derivatively, the feasibility of mitigation’s
joint supply. With relatively high confidence that, even limiting
warming to 2°C globally, catastrophic regional and local consequences will continue to mount throughout this century,127 the interactivity of pledges, their credibility, and the successful pursuit of the
2°C goal becomes extremely difficult for nations to anticipate. In
fact, especially given a “high ambition” coalition’s (unsuccessful) efforts to push the 1.5°C temperature goal at Paris, there is every reason to expect that the more nations already suffering global warming’s damages doubt the prospects for mitigation’s joint supply, the
122. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 7 (2014) [hereinafter AR5 WGII].
123. See, e.g., H. Damon Matthews et al., Cumulative Carbon as a Policy Framework
for Achieving Climate Stabilization, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4365, 436775 (2012) (mapping the emissions cuts needed to keep warming to 2°C globally).
124. HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 267 (discussing poorer countries’ ostensible “right
. . . to exploit the atmosphere as they develop” as a principal cause of “gridlock” on climate
and the tradeoffs entailed for many of them deciding whether to develop with fossil fuels or
to prioritize clean energy-based development); cf. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 217 (2006) (noting that low consumption economies
would have to expand for decades before growing into a preference for environmental protections like those mitigation demands); see http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rm
clima/pdfs/destaques/sternreview_report_complete.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Social Cost of Carbon, REG. (Spring 2016), at
36, 41.
126. See, e.g., François Gemmene, Climate-Induced Population Displacements in a
4°C+ World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 182, 187–93 (2011) (hypothesizing
that population displacements would shift dramatically as between 2°C and 4°C of cumulative global average warming); cf. AR5 WGII, supra note 122, at 21–25 (tracking several
“key risks” across major geophysical regions in 2°C and 4°C scenarios).
127. AR5 WGII, supra note 122, at 64–66; cf. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8(1)
(recognizing the importance of “averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow
onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage”).
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stronger their incentives will be domestically to prefer investing in
adaptation. Part III situates Paris within our federalism and the legal
doctrines governing this unique agreement.
III. OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: SUPREMACY AND
DORMANCY IN A CHANGED WORLD
The Supremacy Clause’s inclusion of “all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States” within
the ranks of the “supreme Law of the Land” that “the judges in every
state shall be bound” by, “anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding”128 left to both state and federal
courts the delicate task of interpreting the nation’s international
agreements into domestic (federal) law.129 Doctrines of self- versus
non-self-executing treaties emerged130 but have remained notoriously
opaque, despite the fact that treaty practice and U.S. treaties in force
have both expanded tremendously since the end of World War II.131
However, the UNFCCC’s status within U.S. law132 must not be confused with the Paris agreement’s status. The latter is an “executive
agreement” nowhere mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, the Treaty
Clause,133 or Article III.134 As already noted, the Paris agreement
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
129. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM:
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 185–245 (2016) (discussing Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920), and Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), and finding the two cases incompatible in their theories of the treaty power and, at the extremes, irreconcilable).
130. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
131. Cf. John C. Yoo, Globalization and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (making historical argument that treaties ordinarily require implementing legislation to fit directly into American
law), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (arguing that
text, structure and history all support a presumption of self-execution of treaties made).
132. The UNFCCC’s “framework” nature is something of a term of art in international
law, see Wirth, supra note 15, at 519, but is otherwise unrelated to its force or status within
US law. Cf. Criddle, supra note 60, at 449–64 (identifying and contrasting “nationalist” and
“internationalist” theories of treaties’ force in domestic courts and concluding that nothing
about a treaty’s international significance must necessarily factor into a court’s application of
treaties domestically). In its only case ever to have addressed an executive agreement made
pursuant to an Article II treaty, the Court held that its legal force turned at least in part on
whether the Senate that had approved the treaty had “authorized” the making of subsequent
executive agreements. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528 (1957).
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur”).
134. But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (affording preemptive
effect to executive agreement); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415–16 (2003)
(stating same in dicta).
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was actively and overtly structured to avoid putting President Obama
in the position of having to seek the Senate or Congress’s support.135
Yet the diplomatic relations created and put in motion by the Paris
agreement are another matter—potentially as consequential within
several important U.S. legal doctrines as a treaty’s text.136 That
leaves to our courts the especially delicate task of sorting a current
presidential administration’s powers over diplomatic relations from
the force and scope of the Supremacy Clause—something scholars
have lately argued about vehemently and at length.137
A. Supremacy in a Changed World
By the time of the founding, several states had, by neglecting (or
refusing) to honor commitments made by the Union, entangled it in
disputes with foreign powers.138 Our federal courts were structured
in no small degree to be able to check those abuses.139 Most importantly, treaties made by the United States are both supreme law of
the land and their own head of federal jurisdiction in Article III.140
This constitutional inter-positioning of the federal courts between
states and foreign powers has since taken on a very different significance in a world of constantly expanding international ties—
commercial, social, legal, and other.141 Indeed, as the ‘We Are Still
In’ coalition shows, it is often subparts of the United States seeking
to redeem the republic’s good name abroad today and that is unlikely
135. A great deal of ink has been shed suggesting that such moves by US Presidents are
inherently unconstitutional. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2287-97 (2006) (collecting sources). Given the
UNFCCC and the President’s Article II powers (and even ignoring theories of inherent executive power), I leave this line of argument about Paris to the side. But see id. (arguing that
Article II leaves to the president, by necessary inference, the power to “complete” treaties
and statutes expressing the will of the people).
136. See infra notes 223–55 and accompanying text.
137. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
731, 734–40 (2010).
138. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 175 (2d
ed. 1997); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (2006).
139. ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 3–18 (2017); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 189–
93; HENKIN, supra note 138, at 298–303.
140. Among the first reported opinions from our Supreme Court was a case enforcing the
Treaty of Paris notwithstanding a Virginia statute to the contrary. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
199 (1796). Recall Article III, Section 2 included cases “arising under . . .Treaties made, or
which shall be made under the Authority of the United States,” as well as “all Cases affecting Ambassadors,” in its jurisdictional subject matters. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
141. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 27–29; Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette
A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA. L. REV. 1621, 1637-1650 (2008); Julian Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2398-409 (2006).

COLBURN

204

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34:6

to change in the near term. Although some have argued this is legally
irrelevant and that courts should interpret silences in the law to prohibit such subnational foreign relations (a kind of “dormant treaty
power”),142 the Supremacy Clause notably excludes a lot by only including its three discrete forms of “supreme Law of the Land.” There
is every reason to believe that the separation of powers checks on the
making of those laws was expected (and intended) to be a safeguard
to the states.143
What can we in the present make of the fact that the common
law, administrative regulations, interstate compacts, and customary
international law are all practically invisible for purposes of federal
supremacy under the Constitution?144 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,145 of course, rejected the inference that the jurisdiction to adjudicate established by Article III entailed the authority to fashion rules
of decision.146 Although Erie arguably trimmed the subject matters
where federal common law-making is appropriate to a discrete list of
fields stemming directly from the Constitution’s structure,147 that is
hardly an afterthought.148 If this federal common law is the true
origin of doctrines like “act of state,”149 “equal footing,”150 the downstream right to a flowing river,151 and/or others,152 that still creates a
142. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1162-64 (2000).
143. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
144. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 137, at 768–69 (characterizing this omission as reflecting
the “Lost World of the Founders”). But see Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1109–14 (2014) (arguing that the values protected by national
supremacy are important enough to motivate a broadly preemptive “dormant foreign affairs”
doctrine).
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80 (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)); see also
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–98 (1941) (holding that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply the conflicts rules of the state in which they sit, citing
Erie).
147. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885–87 (1986). But see id. at 950–82 (arguing that federal
common law can apply wherever federal interests demand a uniform federal standard).
148. Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
149. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
150. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
151. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
152. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (upholding the
creation of a federal rule of decision in cases of the commercial dealings of the United
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great deal of federal “law” that somehow preempts inconsistent state
law without mention in the Supremacy Clause.153 Still more central
to the modern economy are the regulations of federal administrative
agencies which occupy a unique rank in the Supreme Court’s esteem—below that of a federal statute but high enough to preempt inconsistent state law, serve as the basis of a prison sentence,154 and
provide other rules of decision in court.155 Interstate compacts approved by Congress have been (unequivocally) shoe-horned into federal supremacy despite their absence from Article IV.156 Court rules
are a final example: we no longer think that the Federal Rules can
have no independent legal force for their omission from the Supremacy Clause.157
But, then there is the anomalous and beguiling case of international law and its place in our federalism.158 Under Erie, if international law is not incorporated into federal law—and plenty of scholars have mounted substantial arguments that much of it is not159—it
may still find a place in state law.160 The modern Supreme Court has
long maintained that certain elements of international law must be
preemptive for the good of the Nation,161 although it has struggled to
States).
153. Monaghan, supra note 137, at 756–61, 765–68. Statutory interpretive methodology
is another field where some have argued federal common law must necessarily exist. See
Abbe Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie For the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).
154. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1911).
155. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 172 (2007); Chrysler Corp.
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013).
156. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); see also Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the
Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010).
157. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
158. A shrewd and succinct overview of the debate is Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002).
159. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20-28, 80–90 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal
Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); Trimble, supra note 52, at
716–21.
160. Meltzer, supra note 158, at 536–51; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159,
at 870; cf. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 342–61
(2007) (allowing that international law may supply the rule of decision in state and federal
courts if not displaced by valid state or federal law).
161. Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295; Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs,
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provide general contours to that end.162 Given the Constitution’s
clauses explicitly disabling the states in foreign relations,163 it is almost surely correct that “the Constitution was designed to interact in
distinct and specific ways with each branch of the law of nations in
existence at the founding.”164 And much of living with the Constitution and international law’s place in our federalism was originally
handled with great care by the Supreme Court.165
Yet the exact positioning of executive authority in relation to a
governing treaty remains wide open to debate.166 In the immortal
words of Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence, these questions
lay in a “zone of twilight” where the executive may exercise “independent presidential responsibility” but emphatically not to the effect
of ignoring federal law.167 Thus, while some “executive agreements”
not ratified by the Senate may displace contrary state law, the scope
of this power has been tied tightly to the President’s power to enforce
law.168 There is no general presumption, after all, that treaties operate in American courts of their own force.169 The Obama Adminand Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1625-41 (1997).
162. Goldsmith, supra note 161, at 1664–98.
163. Cf. Hollis, supra note 156, at 769–96 (examining the text and history of the Compacts Clause and arguing that compacts or other agreements with foreign states should draw
special constitutional scrutiny given the several dimensions of the Founders’ approach to
states as sovereign).
164. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 144.
165. MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT
EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914, at 62 (2004) (noting that the Marshall Court’s references to international law’s being a part of U.S. law “involved ticklish questions about respecting foreign
sovereigns”).
166. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 234–44; HENKIN, supra note 138, at
194–228; BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 229–31; Wirth, supra note 15, at 518–21;
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 74, at 887–88.
167. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 & n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478
U.S. 221, 240–41 (1986); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680–83 (1981). Article
II makes it the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3. All agree that Paris’s status as an executive agreement depends on its
consistency with federal law. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 74, at 887–88, 929; Bradley
& Goldsmith, Presidential Control, supra note 4, at 1257 (“A foundational tenet of American separation of powers is that all presidential action must be authorized by the Constitution
or an act of Congress.”).
168. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements,
93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign
Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006).
169. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and
those that—while they constitute international law commitments—do not by themselves
function as binding federal law.”).
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istration’s legal justification for the Paris Agreement cited, among a
litany of other potential sources of authority, the UNFCCC.170 Surely
were an Article II treaty to guarantee some primary conduct right,
privilege, immunity, or other entitlement to a foreign government or
foreign national which was thereafter denied in a U.S. court—
misfeasance under the treaty, violating international law171—the incident would at the very least embarrass our presidency and the federal
arrangements atop which it sits.172 Of course, extremal cases of the
kind are extreme (and rare).173 Much more common are treaty rights
and duties imperfectly specified and indeterminately implemented.174
But, if anything, the modern Court has shown itself immensely deferential to state law and interests, ever-ready to curb the preemptive
scope of treaties to shelter those interests.175 Thus, whatever merit
there may be in arguments that subnational efforts to mitigate should
be preempted by a president’s claims that their high emitting econo-

170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Presidential Control, supra note 4, at 1250 & n.222 (describing a copy of the “confidential submission to Congress” concerning the agreement,
done pursuant to the Case Act, offering a “‘kitchen sink’ statement of legal authorities” for
Paris).
171. Fitzmaurice, supra note 60, at 175, 181–82 (observing that the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties both codified principles of pacta sunt servanda and obliged signatories by its own force); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
603–05, 616 (4th ed. 1990).
172. Compare BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 35 (“A state cannot plead provisions of its
own law or deficiencies in that law in answer to a claim against it for an alleged breach of its
obligations under international law.”), with The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(observing that “[i]nternational law is part of our law” and that, barring any “controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision” to the contrary, it should decide “questions of
right” in U.S. courts wherever applicable).
173. The Court has on occasion held that treaties should be construed with reference to
their meaning under the law of nations. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40
(1931) (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890)). But even the liberal internationalists have long conceded the prerogative lies with the signatory. Cf. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1568 (1984) (“In principle, every state has the power—I do not say the right—to violate international law and
obligation and to suffer the consequences.”).
174. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347–60 (2006) (denying an exclusionary remedy for violation of defendant’s right to counsel from Mexican Consulate under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on grounds that convention did not specify
an exclusionary remedy and that Supreme Court generally lacks the power to force equitable
remedies on state courts); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 860–66 (2014) (holding that
chemical weapons convention banning the use of all “toxic chemicals” would not support
criminal liability for attempted poisoning with toxic chemicals as the convention was “nonself-executing”).
175. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (rejecting multiple treaty
grounds for recognizing judgment of International Court of Justice to free Texas inmate on
grounds none of the specific provisions nor any implementing legislation rendered such
judgments binding on state courts); Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360.
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mies could become an important “bargaining chip,”176 they run headlong at least into the Court’s demonstrated solicitude for those same
states.
The most deeply contested terrain in treaties and the treaty power has long been the extent to which the ‘government of limited and
enumerated powers’ on the domestic front177 can use pretenses of
“external objects” like “war, peace, negociation [sic], and foreign
commerce”178 to create initiative power where the Constitution denies
it.179 That in itself complicates expansive interpretations of the president’s unilateral preemptive authority in dealings with foreign powers—like that stated in dicta in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.180 From all that I have been able find in my research,
however, what has never come to the Court is the Article II treaty,
with its independent force in both domestic and international law, and
that treaty’s place in domestic litigation (in light of Articles III and
IV) arrayed against executive actions undoing the implementation
work of a preceding administration, themselves arrayed against subnational implementation of the same treaty. It is hardly surprising
that such a unique tangle of questions would never have arisen in the
Supreme Court. Paris’s inimitable emergence and relationship to the
UNFCCC, to say nothing of the breadth of its signatories and global
support, however, may soon be coming to a court near you. Section
B describes the “dormant” preemptive doctrines that could also factor
into such cases.

176. Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1881–94 (2006).
177. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 138, at 11.
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 177, at 313.
179. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 185–244; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’
End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117
YALE L.J. 1236, 1339–40 (2008); HENKIN, supra note 138, at 185–98.
180. 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003); see Brannon P. Denning & Michael Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004). Oddly, after citing three cases involving recognition and
claims espousal, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1942), the Court in Garamendi
pronounced that “[g]enerally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law,
just as treaties are,” 539 U.S. at 416, immediately before concluding that the executive
agreement at issue in the case did not do so. Id. at 417.
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B. Dormancy in a Changed World
“Dormant” constitutional limitations on states date at least to
1824 and by the middle of the nineteenth century had grown familiar to the Supreme Court.182 Yet, motivated mostly by political theories of union rather than any economic theory of trade,183 this implied
preemption of state laws “designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out of state competitors”184 has long occupied unstable ground amidst the Court’s federalism landmarks.185 By the
middle of the twentieth century, dormant limitations on states’ “intrusion” into foreign relations through the regulation of foreign commercial activity had also been rooted in that ground.186 All told, the
Court has confronted claims against states’ taxation of foreign commerce as such an intrusion,187 as well as claims against various other
posturing toward foreign powers, entities, and capital.188
181

For the era in which the dormancy doctrines hardened, “foreign”
commerce and relations were the exceptions – rather like declarations
of war and peace.189 The Court could mount a colorable claim that
preemption grounded in structural inference and theories of union
was needed to keep states from “prevent[ing] this Nation from
‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.”190 Today, foreign trade and the posturing that manages it is as expected of
governors and metropolitan mayors as foreign business’ search for
181. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 209 (1824).
182. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299, 315–18 (1851)
(summarizing the Court’s twin theories of foreign and interstate commerce, Congress’s control thereof, and states’ remaining prerogatives in foreign and interstate commercial dealings).
183. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 1057 (3d ed. 2000);
see also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425,
429–35 (1982).
184. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
185. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1094–96 (1986).
186. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
187. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); Japan Line, LTD v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159 (1983); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
188. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff’d
sub. nom., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Am. Ins. Ass’n
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Court’s “dormant” preemption theory in Garamendi was criticized for its breadth by a dissent that included Justices Ginsburg, Stevens,
Scalia, and Thomas. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 438–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
189. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
190. Japan Line, LTD v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (quoting
Michelin Tire Corp v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
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favors from host jurisdictions.191 Perhaps even more importantly, as
the latest dormant commerce clause precedents have reflected,192 federal law (here, by treaty) is now so prevalent193 that the original inferential warrant from powers granted but unexercised to judicial
freelancing has all but vanished.194 Indeed, it would be the submersion of judicial power into politics and economic competition that so
many of the Court’s doctrines aim precisely to avoid.195
Still, this dormant preemption has attracted a great deal of attention as subnational climate change initiatives have spread and
strengthened.196 Much of modern field preemption doctrine stems
191. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 35–45, 60–76; David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014); Kysar & Meyler, supra note 141; Ku, supra
note 141; Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 821 (1989).
192. The Court has noticeably tempered dormant commerce clause doctrine over the past
generation. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013); United Haulers’
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 336–37 (2007); West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994); CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-– (1980); see also Rocky
Mtn. Farmers’ Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087–97 (9th Cir. 2013); see generally Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 U. DENV. L. REV. 255 (2017).
In fact, for many areas it will be preemption by a field-occupying federal statute that constitutes the more direct threat to states. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)
(holding that Congress had “left no room for state regulation” of oil tanker design).
193. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 179, at 1248–71; HENKIN, supra note 138, at 175230; LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS
CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE (1984).
194. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations,
106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1831 (2018) (noting the Supreme Court has not used dormant foreign
affairs preemption to strike down a state law since 1968); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign
Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 211 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Preemption].
195. Cf. Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, at 210 (“The waning of the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs means that just about any state law, when applied in a
case involving a foreign element, is potentially subject to judicial preemption. The expanding array of preemptable state laws means that dormant foreign affairs preemption represents
a potentially massive transfer of federal foreign relations lawmaking power to the federal
courts at the expense of the states.”).
196. See, e.g., Jessie Cammack, California, Climate, and Dormant Foreign Affairs
Preemption (Again), 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1642 (2018); Augusta Wilson, Linking Across Borders: Opportunities and Obstacles for a Joint Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative-Western
Climate Initiative Market, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 246–65 (2018); David Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 (2017);
David W. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints on Climate Change Agreements: Legal Risks in
the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Linkage, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10478
(2016); Jeremy Lawrence, The Western Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration and
Constitutional Structure in the United States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225 (2009);
Jeremy Lawrence, Where Federalism and Globalization Intersect: The Western Climate Initiative as a Model for Cross-Border Collaboration Among States and Provinces, 38 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10796 (2008); Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Greenhouse
Gas Regulations, supra note 176.
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from what might be called a “foreign affairs” context.197 Yet skeptics
would surely be correct to note the ubiquity of fossil fuels and their
infrastructure, subsidy, and health risks—and the range of actions
implicated by their disentrenchment and replacement with renewable
energy and carbon-conscious supply chains. If all of that is to be
preempted by structural inferences from the Constitution it would
implicate the federal courts in a vast enterprise, searching for ‘bargaining chips’ to aid a (current) president’s opaque strategy to undo
an executive agreement possessed of treaty-standing under the Vienna Convention and public international law.198 And this, above all,
should give those courts pause in challenges to subnational mitigation
efforts. For the most potent influence in the interpretation of treaties
as the “supreme Law of the Land” at the Supreme Court has lately
been the interpretation’s significance to the “judicial Power.”199 Part
IV considers these points in three contexts where ‘We Are Still In’
efforts are likely to present an unprecedented new normal in US
courts.
IV. PARIS’S FUTURE IN AMERICAN COURTS: THREE CORE CONTEXTS
IN THE NEW NORMAL
This part considers three contexts where the Paris agreement’s
unique position in international and domestic law may influence a
court’s decision involving subnational mitigation efforts, whether as
a function of dormancy or supremacy. Key to any federal court’s intervention on behalf of an aggrieved party will be the exact manner in
which regulatory power is projected—and whether to characterize
that projection as legitimate, as “extraterritorial” and illegitimate, or
as something else. Equally important will be difficult questions surrounding international law’s place in domestic courts and, particularly, courts of general jurisdiction – like many state courts. Finally, the
remedial discretion that every court exercises in granting or withhold197. Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, 187–89 (discussing Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
198. See supra notes 140, 170 and accompanying text.
199. Cf. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–28 (2008) (refusing to find in non-selfexecuting treaty authority for the president to unilaterally change the law and displace state
court judicial discretion); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720–38 (2004) (interpreting Alien Tort Statute to confer jurisdiction to hear but not a distinct cause of action or jurisdiction to prescribe rules of decision for cases of alleged torts committed on foreign soil);
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668 n.15 (1992); Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that Geneva Convention on the
High Seas did not create exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because jurisdiction
over foreign state signatory to the convention would put U.S. federal courts to adjudicating
foreign state liabilities for torts committed on the high seas).
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ing equitable relief inevitably turns on that relief’s prejudice to the
public at large, i.e., consistency with the public good. In each of
these three contexts, sensitive discriminations between Paris and
what preceded it will be critical.
A. Extraterritoriality and Decarbonization: The Scale and Scope
of Mitigation Actions
Globalized finances, supply chains,200 and regulatory interest
therein201 mean that subnational ‘municipal’ authority is more likely
to reach conduct and trade spanning international boundaries.202 Our
own dormant commerce doctrines have labeled this the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction,203 but virtually any serious effort to push
decarbonization by advantaging low carbon competitors (or disadvantaging so-called carbon “majors”) will at least appear extraterritorial and prejudicial in effect.204 It is in the nature of inducing technological change in free markets that regulatory effects spill over into
cognate jurisdictions, though.205 And although the Court has made
clear that it is entirely appropriate to regulate across borders where
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some sub200. HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 113–88.
201. In historical context, it is only quite recently that regulatory attention has turned to
the supply chains producing the goods and services consumed in a jurisdiction—as opposed
to its confinement to the consumption and production therein. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527–79 (2004).
202. Ku, supra note 141, at 2412–14. This comes at a time when it has never been more
difficult to secure Senate and/or Congressional approval of executive branch initiatives
abroad. See Galbraith, supra note 3, at 1723–30.
203. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642–43 (1982) (“The Commerce Clause … precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.”); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810
(1976); see also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 59–60, 62–66 (1st
Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds; Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 400 (2003).
204. See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp.2d 1160,
1183 (E.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d sub nom., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529
F. Supp.2d 1151, 1187–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
205. Cf. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 509–13 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Gould, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (observing that California’s low carbon fuel standard, which took account of fuel’s transport in calculating the carbon intensity
of its production, only utilized state boundaries and long-distance travel for nondiscriminatory reasons and that any indirect regulatory effects in other states were incidental
to California’s legitimate purposes); Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality,
and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 1240 (2015) (tracing the gradual pull of interstate markets on state legislatures and
the gradual federalization of choice of law doctrines by means of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of Article VI).
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stantial effect in the jurisdiction,206 claims that such efforts will “Balkanize” our economy or “impinge on the sovereign interests” of other
states will no doubt continue.207 Renewable portfolio standards, now
in force in some fashion in over three dozen states, will continue to
present such challenges if nothing else.208
The Supreme Court passed on judging California’s so-called
low-carbon fuel standard in 2014.209 But the Ninth Circuit, in a contentious proceeding, divided sharply over the state’s right to advantage lower carbon transport fuels as it did.210 Carbon intensity in
any product increases with the distance it travels to market and/or the
use of fossil fuels in its production. California’s law, thus, disadvantaged fuels derived from coal combustion in far-off states.211 Of
course, states should face relaxed dormant commerce scrutiny to
whatever degree they are a mere “market participant,” i.e., purchaser
or seller.212 And they will also likely find an easier path to the extent
any discriminatory treatment is in favor of some public facilities
needing subsidy.213 The real test of Paris, the UNFCCC, and the strategic value of subnational implementation efforts, is where local law
creates some kind of reward/sanction effect advantaging mitigation.214 In that context, efforts to advantage lower carbon production
206. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796–99 (1993).
207. See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 740 F.3d at 512 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
208. Brannon P. Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1519 (2014).
209. See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Amer. Fuel &
Petrochem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Corey v. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
210. See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky
Mtn. Farmers Union, 740 F.3d at 512 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
211. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082–87. An Oregon scheme mirroring
California’s survived dormant commerce clause attacks, as well. See Am. Fuel & Petrochem.
Mfrs. v. O’Keefe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018).
212. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592–93
(1997); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430-33 (1980). Exactly what differentiates trading from regulating, however, has remained a murky subfield in dormant commerce
clause doctrine. See Francis, supra note 192, at 303–06.
213. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007) (upholding county flow control ordinances that incidentally burdened commerce
while increasing net recycling).
214. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that where a challenger can show that the “burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits,” the law should be invalid under dormant commerce scrutiny); see
also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. 1999) (assuming
for purposes of reviewing the validity of the injunction that a “market participant” exception
exists under the Foreign Commerce Clause because it might permit a simple immunity to
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in parts unknown by burdening access to a local market are inappropriately “discriminatory” or “extraterritorial” only if one ignores the
character of its opposite: maintenance of the fossil fuel subsidies and
consumption aids regardless of their harms to others.215 It is nothing
like the protectionism that unionists have singled out for dormancy’s
strictest scrutiny.216
When it is remembered that a cumulative carbon constraint is
aiming to supply a collective good,217 only a sham application of the
Court’s dormant commerce or dormant foreign relations precedents
would preempt subnational efforts to create a reliable and significant
pull on new, decarbonizing technology.218 The risks of unchecked
warming are real and increasingly manifest,219 and bottom-up efforts
to force technological change can only ever be contributory.220 Indeed, their place in the assurances game Paris re-engineered is wholly
unlike the domestic actions that have provoked ‘foreign affairs’
preemption in the past.221 Unless and until the Congress and President change the law to bar Americans from contributing to these
ends, federal courts have no business doing so on anything more substantial than political theories of union.222
Massachusetts’ sanctioning firms doing business with Burma).
215. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. Cf. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730
F.3d at 1089–90 (observing that regulations are not unduly burdensome to commerce or facially discriminatory simply for affecting in-state and out-of-state interests unequally);
O’Keefe, 903 F.3d at 913 (adopting Rocky Mtn. holding and noting that “[o]ur federal system
recognizes ‘each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments.’”) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)).
216. See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 144, at 1088 & n.12; Regan, supra note 185.
217. See supra notes 48 and 81 and accompanying text.
218. Adelman & Engel, supra note 105, at 841–61 (describing the twin market failures
of GHG emissions and technological innovation in climate mitigation and the necessity of a
collective solution to each); see also Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate
Policy, SCI. MAG., Sept. 11, 2015, at 1170, 1170–71 (arguing that winning coalitions of
green industries thrive on feedback from policies and then become strategic partners in continual strengthening efforts).
219. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080–86 (describing the “life-cycle” analysis used in California low-carbon fuel standard and its targeting GHGs in the atmosphere
which pose “the same local risk to California citizens” as a means of promoting the development of alternative fuels).
220. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
221. Cf. Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, at 209 (“It is no accident that the doctrines were applied by the Supreme Court in two cases in the height of the Cold War involving parties—Cuba and East Germany—who were our Cold War enemies.”).
222. Cf. Barclay’s Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994) (rejecting
dormant foreign affairs preemption claim against California’s worldwide tax on multinational firms and observing that federal courts are “not vested with power to decide how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole
to let the States tax as they please”).
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B. International Law as State Law: Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities Declared
Many state courts are unquestionably possessed of the authority
to declare and apply norms of international applicability in the matters to which they apply.223 François Gény’s neoclassical definition
of customary international law as repeat state action plus opinio juris
sive necessitatis224 has for generations evinced criticisms of its circularity, theoretical incoherence and, increasingly, obsolescence.225 Yet
customs still arise, especially if they are recast as so many international norms.226 State courts are surely bound to apply valid, governing federal law227 and, where customary international law has been
incorporated into federal law, it is final.228 But, as already noted,
Erie insists that this state/federal question not be assumed away simply because a case possesses elements of (inter-)national significance.229
Whether federalized or not, the norms that have arisen from
thick, multilateral environmental regimes are real.230 Moreover, as
discussed above, mitigation/adaptation balancing is inherently politi223. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws:
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1823 (2005).
224. Emily Kadens, Custom’s Past, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
CHANGING WORLD 11, 12-13 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (conventional definition of customary international law includes a two-part test: consistent action/forbearance and state beliefs that the actions or forbearance were required by law).
225. Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87, 97–105 (1991); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 34, 40–45 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016); Joel
P. Tractman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law, CUSTOM’S
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 172 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016).
226. BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 94–106.
227. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2).
228. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 193–268; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1839–41 (1998); HENKIN, supra note 138, at 157–58.
229. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,
409–10 (1990) (holding that federal act of state doctrine does not bar courts from hearing
cases that might impute illegal motivations to foreign state officials); Bergman v. De Sieyes,
170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state
law in determining whether an ambassador in transit is immune from suit).
230. See BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 262–66; Irini Papanicolopulu, The Mediterranean
Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 604, 616–22 (Donald R. Rothwell
et al. eds., 2015); Malcolm D. Evans, The Law of the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 683
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Ved P. Nanda, Environment, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 287, 299–300 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997); see generally
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND
BEYOND (1994) (describing the evolution of fisheries law).
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cal and increasingly local.231 For example, the areas of the world
most likely to benefit from heat-sink-moderated temperatures by their
proximity to an ocean are also most likely to suffer catastrophically
from sea level rise.232 This puts state courts to a choice, ultimately, if
confronted with subnational mitigation effort: what is the scope of
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’? There is no single,
uniquely authoritative way to resolve this obligation under UNFCCC;
Paris surely did not do so.233 But the continuation of the
pledge/review iterations will create COP decisions about emissions
accounting, technology sharing, and other aids to bottom-up collective action that signatories will then translate into domestic reality.234
This will surely present questions about the status of such norms in
municipal courts and domestic law.235 Given the susceptibility of
small contributions to imperceptibility,236 indeed, a court’s simple
mention of Paris or the UNFCCC could be instrumental to others’
confidence and contributions in the future.237 American courts could
become an important adjudicator of customary international norms
arising under Paris’s unique pledge/review system, not least because
of their thicker connections to their electorates (neoliberal objections
to customary international law’s tension with democratic consent is
blunted considerably in the majority of state courts),238 their more
231. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
232. ARCHER & RAHMSTORF, supra note 24, at 133.
233. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
234. The proposition that state courts rarely consider customary international law and
that, when they do, they typically defer to the federal government’s view(s), see, for example, Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 314, although perhaps still the conventional wisdom, ignores
the authority of state courts within our federalism. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–27 (1964) (weighing the possibility that the “act of state” doctrine is
state law).
235. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(observing under another convention/protocol regime that a holding that “the Parties’ postratification side agreements were ‘law’ would raise serious constitutional questions in light
of the nondelegation doctrine, numerous constitutional procedural requirements for making
law, and the separation of powers.”).
236. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
237. Even in fields dominated by bilateral treaties and domestic trade regulation it has
proven essentially impossible to rule out the rise of customary international law as more and
more adjudications converge to common standards. See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 327, 329 (1993) (examining how bilateral investment treaties elucidate and
portend the crystallization of customary international foreign investment law).
238. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1842–76 (2001) (analyzing the difference between state and Article III court’s justiciability doctrine). Curiously, many state judiciaries,
at the same time they have grown closer to an electorate by constitutional changes in the selection of judges, increasingly have looked abroad in interpreting domestic law. See ROBERT
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controllable risks of error,239 and their physical and social proximity
to the local trade-offs adaptation-mitigation optimizing entails.240
Regardless of customary international law’s ultimate juristic footing
in our federalism, declarations of this kind could prove vital to the future specification of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’
obligation under international law.241
The partisan, often bitter politics of international human rights
law which so long shaded these structural debates among American
analysts242 have overshadowed the fields in which customary international norms have been vital to American courts.243 To just this extent, state court adjudication of custom and customary international
norms can supply the evidence of practice and opinio juris that traditional international lawyers so often seek.244 As Professor Stephan
has observed, the “argument for federalizing the law of nations is su-

F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 283–301 (2009).
239. Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008) (exploring the advantages of combining policy variation and reversibility).
240. Not facing the Article III limitations faced by federal courts, see HENKIN, supra
note 138, at 142, state courts are often freer to engage merits questions than are their federal
counterparts. See Lisotkin, supra note 239, at 480; WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 298–301.
241. See BURKE, supra note 230, at 263–302 (tracing the use of domestic sanctions and
other municipal law in the rise of an international moratorium on commercial whaling from
among the parties to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling); Stone, supra note 23, at 298–300 (noting that public expenditures on adaptation are more likely to be
internalized benefits than those on mitigation and that relatively rich nations stand much to
gain from having ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ progressively clarified); cf.
Chodosh, supra note 225, at 110 (observing that the circularities of the opinio juris element
and its “institutional weakness” have consigned customary international law to a dysfunctional status in contemporary practice but that a stricter approach grounded in a forum’s
powers and traditions of declaring its own rules of decision could enhance international custom in both domestic and international venues).
242. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159, at 836 (arguing that Henkin and
others manipulated the third Restatement of foreign relations law’s assertion that customary
international law is federal law through “pure bootstrapping” by citing an article Henkin
himself authored and nothing else), with Koh, supra note 228, at 1828 (“Bradley and Goldsmith mount virtually no arguments explaining why fifty state courts and legislatures should
be free to reject, modify, reinterpret, selectively incorporate or completely oust customary
international law rules from domestic law.”).
243. See, e.g., William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J.
COMPARATIVE L. 383 (2000); Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 783 (1984).
244. Cf. Bradley, supra note 225, at 46 (“Instead of hypothesizing that custom is a reflection of some underlying spirit, will, or consciousness, the standard view today attempts
to ground [customary international law] in the actual practices and beliefs of states.”); Chodosh, supra note 225, at 119–20 (noting that, in light of customary international law’s many
failings and challenges, declarations of custom by municipal courts can provide a middle
path bridging the gaps left by positive, treaty-based law and more nebulous theoretical accounts of opinio juris).
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perficially compelling,”245 but the evidence is overwhelming that the
Framers expected a “general law” of commerce and commercial
practice (“lex mercatoria”) to take root in both state and federal
courts without the strictest (positivistic) attention to that law’s
sources.246
To what degree, then, are state courts of general jurisdiction in
any position to focus and to declare a customary international law of
mitigation? Recall that the UNFCCC’s ‘common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capacities’ to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’247 were finally succeeded after 20+ COPs with Paris’ complex scheme of political and
legal obligations.248 The conventional position casts “parochial state
acts [as] threaten[ing] the foreign relations interests, and perhaps the
national security, of the entire nation—a situation the Constitution is
plainly designed to avoid.”249 Ironically, though, it has been neoliberal revisionists who have pushed back the hardest for state jurisdiction and the authority to declare the law of anything not positively
federal.250 And there is no good reason to assume away state prerogative to interpret these norms in development. Indeed, when empirical work on customary international law has been done, the evidence
gathered suggests that adjudicators are more likely “engaged in a
forward-looking or aspirational exercise” than they are mechanically
running some traditional two-part test for a custom’s existence.251
Every state’s judiciary is presumably as perfectly empowered to
these ends as the judiciary of other states. Of course, the states are
not all the same. Those with especially large markets can pull in investments and induce compliance with their law notwithstanding the
higher costs imposed on carbon-intensive production.252 But states
245. Paul B. Stephan, Inferences of Judicial Lawmaking Power and the Law of Nations,
106 GEO . L.J. 1793, 1805 (2018).
246. See Stephan, supra note 245, at 1796–97; DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC
WORLD, 1664-1830, at 207–58 (2005); Koh, supra note 228, at 1830–31.
247. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
249. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1617, 1621 (1997) (“In foreign affairs, the nation must speak with one voice, not fifty”).
250. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159, at 870–76; Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194; BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139; Trimble, supra note 52, at 718–23.
251. Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do
It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117, 147 (Curtis A.
Bradley ed., 2016).
252. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
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checking one another are surely as accountable or more so than the
presidency left essentially unchecked,253 and state court testing of
public reasons for subnational initiatives on adaptation/mitigation
balancing, because it can be carried on in parallel, can provide an invaluable platform for the sorting of mitigation, and adaptation priorities.254 State court litigation of local laws advantaging or mandating
mitigation efforts should reflect this constitutional prerogative reserved to our states (or to the people).255
……

C. Mitigation Injuries: Remedial Discretion and Subnational
Action

The Roberts Court has gone to considerable lengths to clarify
the standards for the awarding of injunctive relief in federal court.256
As it observed in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms,257 “[i]t is not
enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask
whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue;
rather, a court must determine that an injunction should issue.”258
The Court’s factored tests—one for preliminary and another for permanent relief259—are to inform the sound discretion of the trial
court.260 And the Roberts Court has made it emphatically clear that
GLOBAL ECONOMY 5–8 (1995) (calling this the “California effect”).
253. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1275 (“[T]he main forms of accountability for presidential control over international law are congressional and public scrutiny of
international agreements made by the executive branch, a task made harder by the fact that
the executive branch has not entirely complied with its publication and reporting duties
. . .”).
254. Notwithstanding Professor Livermore’s recent assertion that “[c]limate change is
not a context in which state experimentation is likely to produce valuable deliberative information” about the “policy question[s]” in adaptation/mitigation balances, Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 692 (2017), it should be quite clear
that the practical keys to any electorate’s support for mitigation are twofold: (1) how to reduce the costs of decarbonization both in the immediate and medium-term futures; and (2)
whether mitigation contributions can and are likely to be matched by enough other jurisdictions to be worth the (jurisdiction’s) sacrifice(s). See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying
text. If this isn’t “valuable deliberative information” of the sort Livermore maintains justifies
decentralized experimentation, nothing is.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
256. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 572 U.S. 663 (2014); Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418 (2009); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Sereboff v. Mid. Atlantic Med. Servs.,
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
257. Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
258. Id. at 158 (emphasis in original).
259. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997,
1023–44 (2015).
260. For a preliminary injunction, the factors are (1) likelihood of success on the merits,
(2) likelihood the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the bal-
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there is no general presumption either favoring or disfavoring any
award of equitable relief.261 An earlier era where presumptions on
the presence or lack of “irreparable” injury made equity doctrines
tick262 has given way to a factored but largely free-form weighing of
hardships, functioning mostly as a four-pronged proof burden on the
party seeking the relief.263
In the context of injunctive relief against government, the Court
has also said that “there is little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory relief.”264 But this is not always so. A declaratory judgment is only fully remedial if in its institutional context the
parties (or their successors in office) behave as an injunction would
entitle the claimants to demand.265 As regulatory and statutory
claimants have faced the ‘no presumption in favor’ hurdle, it has become manifest that many policy-driven contours in government can
continue uninterrupted in the absence of an injunction.266 For
preemption and Commerce Clause challenges, particularly, injunctive
(and especially preliminary injunctive) relief can be decisive—and it
is not to be skipped around the Court’s factored tests.267 Even folance of equities between the parties, and (4) the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
[Short Form – Rule 10.9] For a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must have demonstrated
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury, (2) that the remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury, (3) that the balance of equities is in favor of the remedy,
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the remedy. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
261. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of
discretion.”); Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an
injunction…. Issuing a preliminary injunction only on a possibility of irreparable harm is
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
262. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 219–31
(2012).
263. Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 262, at 210–11; see also Bray, supra note 259,
at 1036–44.
264. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982); see also Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943).
265. Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2459–87 (2014) Generations of “institutional reform” litigation put
this point in stark relief. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1999).
266. Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485
(2010).
267. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668–70 (2003) (rejecting
the award of a preliminary injunction in dormant commerce clause challenge to state law
regulating prescription drug prices because “petitioner had not carried its burden of showing
a probability of success on the merits of its claims”).
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lowing the Ninth Circuit’s remand to the district court for further
proceedings, California’s continued implementation of its low carbon
fuel standard (LCFS) almost a decade after the plaintiffs had first
filed their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief was unremitting.268 A preliminary injunction during that time could have
been lethal for the LCFS program and clearly implicated the “public
interest.”269
Of course, the supply of public (or collective) goods is full of
uncertainties surrounding the beneficiaries, reasonable alternatives,
optimizing supply, etc.270 The Supreme Court was obviously aware
of this when, in applying its factored test in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,271 it first quoted George Washington and
worked to explain the benefits of military preparedness.272 And although the Court has remained studiously aloof to the unique problems presented by the diffusion of environmental risks and, thus, their
abatement,273 careful consideration of the contributory nature of decarbonization policies and technology forcing, especially in light of
Paris’s cumulative carbon and assurances framework,274 would turn
to whether the public interest factor can ever defeat an application for
injunction—preliminary or permanent. Of the “notably porous”275
terms in the Court’s factors, the ‘public interest’ anchor in each test,
shorn of presumptions, can easily present what courts are least able to
measure within the confines of a lawsuit.276 The eBay Court may
have sought to blunt this critique by phrasing its factor in the nega268. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258 F. Supp.3d 1134, 1138–40 (E.D. Cal.
2017).
269. As Judge Denlow observed five years before Winter, the ‘public interest’ factor in
the granting of preliminary injunctive relief allowed the court to consider the interests of
non-parties—and to override a showing of irreparable harm by the plaintiff. Morton Denlow,
The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV.
LITIG. 495, 511–12 (2003).
270. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
271. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
272. Winter, 555 U.S. at 12. The Court made a similar case, if only implicitly, in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318–19 (1982) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction against US Navy for probable violations of the Clean Water Act).
273. Goldstein, supra note 266, at 528–39; Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion,
Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 537–38 (1984) (noting that injunctions to enforce environmental statutes often must grapple with “qualified”
legal rights and duties combining multiple goods).
274. See supra notes 60-110 and accompanying text.
275. Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 262, at 213.
276. Cf. Bray, supra note 259, at 1028–29 (calling the public interest factor a “longstanding concern of equity” but noting that making it something a claimant must prove
lacked support in the equity traditions).
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tive,277 but there is no escaping the challenge with phraseology. Either plaintiffs bear a burden and the court must choose on the public
interest factor or not.
Unlike the old protectionism cases, mitigation efforts today are
rarely a projection of “unaccountable power”278 aiming to rig the
terms by which firms compete. In the vast majority of instances
where subnational decarbonization efforts are afoot, a public has
elected to burden itself to some considerable extent by contributing –
be it in the form of taxes, higher prices, constrained product choices,
conservation, etc.279 That has often been a significant factor in
dormant commerce liability determinations.280 For purposes of
weighing the public interest in the withholding of injunctive relief despite some (probable) doctrinal violation (and even laying aside the
concentrated economic and political power of fossil fuel interests and
other carbon majors281), a local or state public’s autonomy and right
to contribute should weigh no less in the court’s balance than should
any injunction’s binding of non-parties282 or the polycentricity of
climate mitigation decision-making.283 With GHG emissions’ accumulation284 and future peoples’ practicable invisibility in electoral
politics, any court (preliminarily) enjoining a subnational mitigation
policy for private losses in profitability must surely demand clear and
convincing evidence of mistake.285 To be sure, declaratory relief may
277. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
278. TRIBE, supra note 183, at 411.
279. See, e.g., Lawrence, The Western Climate Initiative, supra note 196, at 1227–30.
Moreover, as Washington’s initiative 1631 demonstrated, they just as easily elect not to do
so. See Timothy Cama, Washington State Voters Reject Carbon Tax, THE HILL (Nov. 7,
2018, 12:11 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/415418-washington-statevoters-reject-carbon-tax.
280. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 (2007) (plurality opinion); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146–52 (1986);
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956–57 (1982); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–73 (1981).
281. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, On Localism and the Persistent Power of the State, 112 AM.
J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 285, 289 (2018).
282. Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 275 (4th ed. 2010) (observing that injunctions against government enforcement of regulations should ordinarily pertain
only to the parties bringing suit); see Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (same).
283. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–
405 (1978) (noting that motivations of self-interest make the adversarial presentation of argument in most bilateral adjudications more reliable than they would be for polycentric tasks
and adjudications).
284. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
285. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (calling the preliminary injunction an “extraordinary remedy”); see also Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he old sliding-scale approach to preliminary injunctions . . .
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or may not achieve what a personal command backed by the contempt power can—which is exactly why the Court’s ‘new equity’ has
so forcefully underscored judicial choice.286 But in the context of
subnational GHG emissions abatement and a federal court’s duty to
consider the public interest before enjoining efforts to contribute toward Paris’ ends, this must be a choice alert to the values of subnational autonomy, the ever-present right simply to do business elsewhere, and the unfortunate fact that we are all running out of time.
V. CONCLUSION
The in again/out again nature of even subnational climate initiatives is indicative of the adaptation/mitigation trade-offs more and
more governments are facing. Even if a new president in 2021 recommits the U.S. government to the Paris agreement and America’s
2016 pledge, a formidable opposition to any nationally imposed caps
on carbon will almost surely re-emerge and complicate (if not defeat)
any legislative alternatives. With cheap, pervasive fossil fuel energy
as tightly tied to economic prosperity as it was in the twentieth century, decarbonizing transport, electrical grids, and other energyintensive industrial sectors without the complete or at least nearcomplete cooperation of all economically significant jurisdictions
puts mitigation into a difficult situation politically, as well. In short,
Trump’s vacuum, if only in legacy form, will probably persist for the
foreseeable future. Subnational actions will therefore need legal protection even as they struggle forward politically. American courts
would do well to study very carefully the features of our foreign affairs federalism and, in assessing subnational climate mitigation efforts, take their cues from the best, most adaptive parts of that tradition.
287

is no longer controlling or even viable. It appears that a party moving for a preliminary injunction must meet four independent requirements.”).
286. Cf. Bray, supra note 259, at 1036 (“The Court’s exposition of equitable principles
has been dominated by two themes. One is the exceptionalism of equitable remedies, and the
other is the pervasive discretion that courts have when granting them.”).
287. Wilson, supra note 196, at 237–39, 265–66; see generally Jonas Monast, From
Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New Challenges in Carbon Market Design, 8 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175 (2017).

